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### 1

#### The resolution indicates affs should advocate topical government change

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Specific, limited resolutions ensure mutual ground which is key to sustainable controversy without sacrificing creativity or openness

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Deliberation requires a predetermined subject—they over-determine the rez more than us by assuming debates are the ultimate arbiter of its value as opposed to a means to facilitate clash

Adolf G. **Gundersen,** Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M, **2000**

POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2000, p. 104-5. (DRGNS/E625)

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separation. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political decision-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engagement with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet deliberation is also a form of political action that **precedes the actual** taking and **implementation** of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators **require something to deliberate about and that** deliberation **presumes certain institutional structures** and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting partisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

**Galloway 7** – professor of communications at Samford University (Ryan, “Dinner And Conversation At The Argumentative Table: Reconceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative Dialogue”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

#### Game spaces like debate are distinct from other forms of education and public speaking. There has to be a balance of ground or else one side claims the high ground and creates a de facto monologue

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Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Decision-making skills outweighs—deliberative debate models impart skills critical to effective democracy

Christian O. **Lundberg 10** Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### Our argument is particularly true for wind aesthetics

Phadke 10

Department of Environmental Studies, Macalester College, Environmental Politics Vol. 19, No. 1, February 2010, 1–20 Steel forests or smoke stacks: the politics of visualisation in the Cape Wind controversy

Visual controversies over the siting of new wind, geothermal and solar power facilities are affecting the nation’s ability to produce more renewable energy. Wind energy is perhaps the most disputed domain, evidenced by current project opposition in states as diverse as Wisconsin, Nevada, New York, Vermont and Oregon. In the absence of a national policy dialogue about the landscape impacts of our new energy choices, public deliberation about wind power will continue to be reduced to dueling images of smoke stacks and steel forests. While industry public relations campaigns promote wind power as ‘homegrown’ and ‘green’, the Cape Wind case signals that enculturating renewable energy will be as much about new civic processes as it is about new projects. Alternative energy sources have often been defined by the absence of heavy pollution. Yet, these sources have temporality and materiality. They leave footprints. As one public commentator on the draft EIS noted, ‘Nantucket Sound is not renewable’.14 Viewed in this light, the Cape Wind project enters an interesting space in environmental politics and prompts us to ask how our regulatory agencies can reasonably value and measure the affective realms of renewable energy. Melding insights from visual studies and deliberative democracy, this article has argued that there has been a striking lack of attention to the visual realm as a site of political claims making. By documenting both the production of viewshed simulations and their reception and subversion by members of the public in the Cape Wind debate, it has demonstrated that visual impact assessment is an immature policy craft that requires greater public scrutiny. When we open up these processes to critical investigation, we find that visual simulations encode social and cultural values. Yet, when these simulations ‘go public’, the politics inherent in their production get erased. As these images circulate in public discourse, they exert power over viewing publics who chose to support or subvert the images based on individual and collective cultural rationalities. Most surprisingly, the deliberations that ensue about visual impact have little place or space in administrative decision making beyond conventional and confrontational EIS protocols. The new energy economy requires policy frameworks, and deliberative spaces, that open up environmental impact processes to expressions of cultural rationality. Bocking (2004) argues that shifts in deliberative processes can help produce social acceptance. He suggests that we need a vision of science and technology that closely integrates research and deliberation as complementary approaches for understanding the world. Such a vision, he argues, is ‘closer to how knowledge is viewed by people outside the scientific community: tied to its social, political, economic and cultural contexts’ (p. 225). Given the current wind energy development frenzy, we are at an important juncture for policy makers and citizen groups to ask a range of descriptive and normative questions about how visual impact analyses are performed, whose views should count and what mechanisms are most appropriate for public engagement in the process.

### 2

#### Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced – conditions are regulations and aren’t topical

Lars E.R Anell (Chairman, WTO panel) 1989 “CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68)

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### Plan’s a regulation – not a restriction. It’s massively unlimiting – the regulation is just part of the NEPA review process for siting. It doesn’t prevent siting – it just says projects have to be reviewed first

Tidwell, 11 – their inherency author

[Thomas L. Forest Service Chief, 08/04/2011, "Final Directives for Forest Service Wind Energy Special Use Authorizations, Forest Service Manual 2720, Forest Service Handbooks 2609.13 and 2709.11"

<https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2011/08/04/2011-19673/final-directives-for-forest-service-wind-energy-special-use-authorizations-forest-service-manual>, accessed 10-29-12, AFB]

Consistent with applicable law, authorized officers will address the potential effects of wind energy projects, including effects on recreational values, cultural resources, scenery, public access, and public safety, in environmental analysis conducted on wind energy applications. Authorized officers will consider the number of acres proposed for use at pre-proposal meetings, during screening of proposals, and during review of applications, including environmental analysis. Impacts for the next seven generations may not be reasonably foreseeable. NEPA and its implementing regulations require analysis of reasonably foreseeable impacts, and the Agency will comply with that requirement in its site-specific NEPA analysis.

Voting issue -

#### Including regulations is a limits disaster

William Offutt Doub (Former United States Representative to the Southern Interstate Nuclear Board, principal in the law firm of Doub and Muntzing, which he formed in 1977. Previously he was a partner in the law firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae. He was a member of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1971 - 1974. He served as a member of the Executive Advisory Committee to the Federal Power Commission in 1968 - 1971 and was appointed by the President of the United States to the President's Air Quality Advisory Board in 1970) 1976 “Energy Regulation: A Quagmire for Energy Policy” Annual Review of Energy Vol. 1: 715-725 (Volume publication date November 1976) DOI: 10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435

FERS began with the recognition that federal energy policy must result from concerted efforts in all areas dealing with energy, not the least of which was the manner in which energy is regulated by the federal government. Energy selfsufficiency is improbable, if not impossible, without sensible regulatory processes, and effective regulation is necessary for public confidence. Thus, the President directed that "a comprehensive study be undertaken, in full consultation with Congress, to determine the best way to organize all energy-related regulatory activities of the government." An interagency task force was formed to study this question. With 19 different federal departments and agencies contributing, the task force spent seven months deciphering the present organizational makeup of the federal energy regulatory system, studying the need for organizational improvement, and evaluating alternatives. More than 40 agencies were found to be involved with making regulatory decisions on energy. Although only a few deal exclusively with energy, most of the 40 could significantly affect the availability and/or cost of energy. For example, in the field of gas transmission, there are five federal agencies that must act on siting and land-use issues, seven on emission and effluent issues, five on public safety issues, and one on worker health and safety issues-all before an onshore gas pipeline can be built. The complexity of energy regulation is also illustrated by the case of Standard Oil Company (Indiana), which reportedly must file about 1000 reports a year with 35 different federal agencies. Unfortunately, this example is the rule rather than the exception.

#### Precision: Only direct prohibition is a restriction – key to predictability

Sinha (former judge of the Supreme Court of India) 2006 “Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Asian Food Industries”

We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. and Others v. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and others [AIR 1979 SC 1459] stated the law thus:

"It appears that a distinction between regulation and restriction or prohibition has always been drawn, ever since Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. Regulation promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas prohibition obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied. The Oxford English Dictionary does not define regulate to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word regulating without using the word prohibiting or some such word, to bring out that effect."

### 3

#### We affirm a perspective that wind turbines are magnificently ugly.

#### The affirmative’s use of beauty as a concept allows for the identification of things that are not beautiful – the more they use the concept and the more they say that the “world becomes ugly” the more power the ability of people to exclude the ugly from society. The problem with the status quo is not that we think that wind mills are ugly – rather it is that we understand ugliness as a reason to defame, exclude and limit. The 1AC has mis-identified the solution, instead of changing how we understand beauty, we should instead change how we understand ugliness. Vote negative to affirm ugliness and in doing so rupture how we understand aesthetics.

Mingus 2011 (Mia, Full text of a keynote address for the Femmes of Colour symposium, queer physically disabled woman of color, korean transracial and transnational adoptee writer and organizer “moving towards the ugly” http://leavingevidence.wordpress.com/2011/08/22/moving-toward-the-ugly-a-politic-beyond-desirability/

As femmes of color—however we identify—we have to push ourselves to go deeper than consumerism, ableism, transphobia and building a politic of desirability. Especially as femmes of color. We cannot leave our folks behind, just to join the femmes of color contingent in the giant white femme parade. As the (generational) effects of global capitalism, genocide, violence, oppression and trauma settle into our bodies, we must build new understandings of bodies and gender that can reflect our histories and our resiliency, not our oppressor or our self-shame and loathing. We must shift from a politic of desirability and beauty to a politic of ugly and magnificence. That moves us closer to bodies and movements that disrupt, dismantle, disturb. Bodies and movements ready to throw down and create a different way for all of us, not just some of us. [\*share North Carolina story] The magnificence of a body that shakes, spills out, takes up space, needs help, moseys, slinks, limps, drools, rocks, curls over on itself. The magnificence of a body that doesn’t get to choose when to go to the bathroom, let alone which bathroom to use. A body that doesn’t get to choose what to wear in the morning, what hairstyle to sport, how they’re going to move or stand, or what time they’re going to bed. The magnificence of bodies that have been coded, not just undesirable and ugly, but un-human. The magnificence of bodies that are understanding gender in far more complex ways than I could explain in an hour. Moving beyond a politic of desirability to loving the ugly. Respecting Ugly for how it has shaped us and been exiled. Seeing its power and magic, seeing the reasons it has been feared. Seeing it for what it is: some of our greatest strength. Because we all do it. We all run from the ugly. And the farther we run from it, the more we stigmatize it and the more power we give beauty. Our communities are obsessed with being beautiful and gorgeous and hot. What would it mean if we were ugly? What would it mean if we didn’t run from our own ugliness or each other’s? How do we take the sting out of “ugly?” What would it mean to acknowledge our ugliness for all it has given us, how it has shaped our brilliance and taught us about how we never want to make anyone else feel? What would it take for us to be able to risk being ugly, in whatever that means for us. What would happen if we stopped apologizing for our ugly, stopped being ashamed of it? What if we let go of being beautiful, stopped chasing “pretty,” stopped sucking in and shrinking and spending enormous amounts of money and time on things that don’t make us magnificent? Where is the Ugly in you? What is it trying to teach you? And I am not saying it is easy to be ugly without apology. It is hard as fuck. It threatens our survival. I recognize the brilliance in our instinct to move toward beauty and desirability. And it takes time and for some of us it may be impossible. I know it is complicated. …And I also know that though it may be a way to survive, it will not be a way to thrive, to grow the kind of genders and world we need. And it is not attainable to everyone, even those who want it to be. What do we do with bodies that can’t change no matter how much we dress them up or down; no matter how much we want them to? What about those of us who are freaks, in the most powerful sense of the word? Freakery is that piece of disability and ableism where bodies that are deformed, disfigured, scarred and non-normatively physically disabled live. Its roots come out of monsters and goblins and beasts; from the freak shows of the 1800’s where physically disabled folks, trans and gender non-conforming folks, indigenous folks and people of color were displayed side-by-side. It is where “beauty” and “freak” got constructed day in and day out, where “whiteness” and “other” got burned into our brains. It is part of the legacy of Ugly and it is part of my legacy as a queer disabled woman of color. It is a part of all of our history as queer people of color. It is how I know we must never let ourselves be on the side of the gawking crowd ever again in any way. It is the part of me that doesn’t show my leg. It is the part of me that knows that building my gender—my anything—around desirability or beauty is not just an ableist notion of what’s important, but will always keep me chasing what doesn’t want me. Will always keep me hurling swords at the very core of me. There is only the illusion of solace in beauty. If age and disability teach us anything, it is that investing in beauty will never set us free. Beauty has always been hurled as a weapon. It has always taken the form of an exclusive club; and supposed protection against violence, isolation and pain, but this is a myth. It is not true, even for those accepted in to the club. I don’t think we can reclaim beauty. Magnificence has always been with us. Always been there in the freak shows—staring back at the gawking crowd, in the back rooms of the brothels, in the fields fresh with cotton, on the street corners in the middle of the night, as the bombs drop, in our breaths after surviving the doctor’s office, crossing the border, in the first quiet moments of a bloody face after the attack is done. Magnificence was there. Magnificence was with me in the car rides home after long days being dehumanized, abused and steeled in the medical industrial complex. It was there with me when I took my first breaths in my mother’s arms in Korea, and a week later those first days alone without her realizing I wasn’t going home. Magnificence has always been with us. If we are ever unsure about what femme should be or how to be femme, we must move toward the ugly. Not just the ugly in ourselves, but the people and communities that are ugly, undesirable, unwanted, disposable, hidden, displaced. This is the only way that we will ever create a femme-ness that can hold physically disabled folks, dark skinned people, trans and gender non-conforming folks, poor and working class folks, HIV positive folks, people living in the global south and so many more of us who are the freaks, monsters, criminals, villains of our fairytales, movies, news stories, neighborhoods and world. This is our work as femmes of color: to take the notion of beauty (and most importantly the value placed upon it) and dismantle it (challenge it), not just in gender, but wherever it is being used to harm people, to exclude people, to shame people; as a justification for violence, colonization and genocide. If you leave with anything today, leave with this: you are magnificent. There is magnificence in our ugliness. There is power in it, far greater than beauty can ever wield. Work to not be afraid of the Ugly—in each other or ourselves. Work to learn from it, to value it. Know that every time we turn away from ugliness, we turn away from ourselves. And always remember this: I would rather you be magnificent, than beautiful, any day of the week. I would rather you be ugly—magnificently ugly.

### 4

#### The United States Federal Government should establish that the penalty for violating the restrictions on wind turbines on federal scenic rivers and trails is entry into a Supplemental Environmental Project. Implementation of the Supplemental Environmental Program should nullify additional legal penalties from the violating action, and any conflicting federal laws and regulations should be modified to provide a narrow exemption for the above penalty.

#### Penalties determine regulatory compliance—restrictions are irrelevant if penalties are marginal

Center for Progressive Regulation, 2008, Environmental Enforcement, progressiveregulation.org/perspectives/environEnforce.html

Effective enforcement is key to ensuring that the ambitious goals of our environmental statutes are realized. Enforcement refers to the set of actions that the government can take to promote compliance with environmental law. . Currently, rates of noncompliance with environmental laws remain disturbingly high; experts believe that as many as twenty to forty percent of firms regulated by federal environmental statutes regularly violate the law. Tens of millions of citizens live in areas out of compliance with the health based standards of the Clean Air Act, and close to half of the water bodies in the country fail to meet water quality standards set by the Clean Water Act. In communities burdened by multiple sources of pollution, noncompliance has particularly serious health consequences for affected residents.

As in virtually every other area of government regulation, environmental enforcement traditionally has been based on the theory of deterrence. This theory assumes that persons and businesses act rationally to maximize profits, and will comply with the law where the costs of noncompliance outweigh the benefits of noncompliance. The job of enforcement agencies is to make both penalties and the probability of detection high enough that it becomes irrational– unprofitable-- for regulated firms to violate the law.

EPA’s enforcement policies traditionally have reflected these principles. EPA has emphasized the importance of regular inspections and monitoring activity to detect noncompliance, and has responded to violations with swift and appropriate sanctions. EPA’s policies also mandate that the agency recover the economic benefit firms realize through noncompliance, since if a firm is able to profit from illegal activity, it has little incentive to comply in the first place.

#### The CP’s SEP penalty is just that—it causes the same industry response as the aff, without lifting the restriction

David Dana, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 1998, ARTICLE: THE UNCERTAIN MERITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT REFORM: THE CASE OF SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 1181, Lexis

The previous analysis illustrates that the inclusion of SEPs in an enforcement regime may lead to negotiated settlements that cost violators substantially less than the standard monetary penalty. The particular implications of this insight for a deterrence analysis depend on whether the standard monetary penalty represents "an optimal penalty" or instead a sub- or super-optimal penalty. As a preliminary matter, a brief discussion of the concept of optimal penalty (PEN<opt>) thus may be in order. Economists typically regard the goal of an enforcement regime as the achievement of "optimal deterrence." The phrase optimal deterrence, of course, implies that absolute or complete deterrence of regulatory violations should not be the goal of an enforcement regime. Rather, the regime should act to prevent violations which will generate social costs in excess of social benefits. Conversely, of course, the regime should not discourage violations that produce net social benefits. In settings involving perfect detection and prosecution of regulatory violations by government agencies, a penalty equalling the social harm of a violation will produce optimal deterrence. Where detection and prosecution are imperfect, a penalty equalling the harm of a violation will result in underdeterrence because potential violators will discount the nominal penalty to take account of the probability that they will evade detection and/or prosecution. To achieve optimal deterrence, therefore, [\*1206] nominal penalties must equal the social harm divided by the probability of detection and prosecution. The standard monetary penalty for any particular regulatory violation - the penalty that would be imposed in the absence of any SEP settlement options - logically can have only one of three relations to the optimal penalty: The standard monetary penalty can be less than the optimal penalty, equal to the optimal penalty, or greater than the optimal penalty. In all three of these cases, the introduction of SEP settlement options into an enforcement regime is troublesome from an optimal deterrence perspective. Each case will be taken in turn. 1. pen[in'mon.std'] < pen<opt> Where the standard monetary penalty is less than the optimal penalty, regulators' exclusive reliance on monetary penalties will produce underdeterrence. n77 That is, some violations will occur even though the social costs of the violations exceed the social benefits. The introduction of SEPs into such regimes will only make matters worse: SEPs will lower regulated entities' expected penalties for regulatory violations n78 and [\*1207] hence produce more underdeterrence and more socially costly violations. For example, imagine that the harm from a particular regulatory violation has a dollar equivalent value of $ 400, and the perceived probability of detection is 0.1. The optimal penalty thus would be $ 400/0.1 or $ 4000. Assume, however, that the standard monetary penalty is only $ 3000 and regulated entities' expected penalty for violating the regulation is thus only $ 300. Profit-maximizing regulated entities will take the risk of violating the regulation if they expect to gain more than $ 300 by doing so. Now assume that a regulatory agency adds SEP settlements to the enforcement regime. The regulated entity in question now believes that there is a fifty percent probability that it could successfully negotiate a SEP in the event government regulators detect its regulatory noncompliance. n79 Assume also that the regulated entity estimates that the SEP discount or savings off the standard monetary penalty would be thirty-three percent, so that the expected cost of a SEP would be $ 2000. The total expected penalty thus would be 0.1[(0.5)($ 3000) + (0.5)(0.66)($ 3000)], or approximately $ 250. This reduction in the expected penalty from $ 300 to $ 250 could translate into real differences in regulated entities' behavior. Under the pre-SEP regime, regulated entities at least would avoid socially undesirable violations offering them less than $ 300 in savings. The addition of SEPs to the regime eliminates deterrence for violations offering between $ 250 and $ 300 in savings. 2. pen[in'mon.std'] = pen<opt> Where the standard monetary penalty equals the optimal penalty, the enforcement regime will achieve optimal deterrence. Regulated entities will be deterred from committing all of the potential violations that result in greater social loss than social gain, but they will not be deterred from [\*1208] committing any potential violations that are, on net, socially beneficial. The introduction of SEPs into the penalty regime will lower expected penalties and thus produce a shift from this state of optimal deterrence to one of underdeterrence.

#### Independently, establishing SEP penalties solves inevitable environmental crisis

Jeff Ganguly, Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, Fall 1998, COMMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION THROUGH SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS AND CREATIVE NEGOTIATION: RENEWED COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT, 26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 189, Lexis

Such a dynamic has been developing through EPA's employment of SEPs as well. While oversight is critical to ensure the SEP program continues to attain breakthrough achievements in creative and effective settlement agreements, the unique ability of SEPs to respond to the individual circumstances of environmental problems must be maintained. Thus, while litigation remains an effective tool to apply pressure and force action in some cases, dispute resolution and creative settlements should become the goal in the new generation of environmental enforcement. The use of SEPs is only one advantage to dispute resolution, as SEP provisions could be written into federal statutes and become an everyday part of adjudicated relief. Dispute resolution also saves time and money. n303 All of these qualities, as evidenced by the MHD settlement, are the most effective means of responding to environmental crises. Apart from outright prevention, dispute negotiation and community remediation through creative settlements and SEPs continue to be one of the most effective means of preserving and protecting human health and the environment.

#### Extinction

Clark and Downes 6

Dana Clark, Center for International Environmental Law, and David Downes, US Interior Dept. Policy Analysis Senior Trade Advisor, 2006, What price biodiversity?, http://www.ciel.org/Publications/summary.html

Biodiversity is the diversity of life on earth, on which we depend for our survival. The variability of and within species and ecosystems helps provide some of our basic needs: food, shelter, and medicine, as well as recreational, cultural, spiritual and aesthetic benefits. Diverse ecosystems create the air we breathe, enrich the soil we till and purify the water we drink. Ecosystems also regulate local and global climate. No one can seriously argue that biodiversity is not valuable.

Nor can anyone seriously argue that biodiversity is not at risk. There are over 900 domestic species listed as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act, and 4,000 additional species are candidates for listing. We are losing species as a result of human activities at hundreds of times the natural rate of extinction. The current rate of extinction is the highest since the mass extinction of species that wiped out the dinosaurs millions of years ago.

The Economics of Biodiversity Conservation

The question which engenders serious controversy is whether society can afford the costs associated with saving biodiversity. Opponents of biodiversity conservation argue that the costs of protecting endangered species are too high. They complain that the regulatory burden on private landowners is too heavy, and that conservation measures impede development. They seek to override scientific determinations with economic considerations, and to impose cost/benefit analyses on biodiversity policy making.

An equally important question, however, is whether we can afford not to save biodiversity. The consequences of losing this critical resource could be devastating. As we destroy species and habitat, we endanger food supplies (such as crop varieties that impart resistance to disease, or the loss of spawning grounds for fish and shellfish); we lose the opportunity to develop new medicines or other chemicals; and we impair critical ecosystem functions that protect our water supplies, create the air we breathe, regulate climate and shelter us from storms. We lose creatures of cultural importance - the bald eagle is an example of the cultural significance of biodiversity and also of the need for strong regulations to protect species from extinction. And, we lose the opportunity for mental or spiritual rejuvenation through contact with nature.

### Case

#### Perspectivism fails – epistemologically incoherent concept that degenerates into the aesthetic relativism it seeks to escape

**A&E 10** [Anything and Everything, philosophy thoughts, SEPTEMBER 14, 2010, “refutation of nietzsche's perspectivism”]

Nietzsche's "perspectivism" is not therefore simply rejecting truth (full relativism). It acknowledges ontological realism (i.e., there is a reality to be known), but at the same time affirms epistemic relativism (i.e., that any acknowledgement of reality is necessarily from a particular perspective or viewpoint, and this shapes how reality is acknowledged). Nietzsche's critique of the "prejudice" of philosophers is therefore the assumption that there is one way to acknowledge reality, not that there is a reality to be known. ¶ does nietzsche deny the existence of an external reality? no, but for epistemic relativism he confuses ontologically subjective experience (mind) with epistemic objectivity, mistakenly believing the former is epistemic and thus why his epistemology is relative. he thinks that a multitude of views make for a reality relative to each view. what he doesn't get is that a plurality of views can all be within the domain of views that can equally affirm objective reality. if there are multiple correct corresponding viewpoints for each interaction with objective reality, then you have epistemic objectivity with claims to metaphysical/ontological objectivity. if there are multiple correct corresponding viewpoints for each interaction with a reality that is equivalent to itself (seeing different parts of a table and recognizing it is a table, but since they are from multiple perspectives, the table as defined in reality according to this idea is table (subscript 1) = table (subscript 2) = table (subscript n)) but is not itself per se (being itself would mean a tautology: table (subscript 1) \*is\* table (subscript 1)), and thus is not \*the same\* objective reality, then you have the possibility for multiple realities as they act as "mirrors", having identical content but being separate entities. however, since the mirrors are interchangeable due to their identical content, each viewpoint can correspond to any of the mirrors. so nietzsche has things "backwards" of sorts (not inverted or the inverse per se, just that the number that was previous associated with epistemology (number is more than one -- many) is now associated with metaphysics/ontology (number is more than one -- many)): with epistemic objectivity you have many viewpoints compatible with one objective reality, but with nietzsche's theory any of many viewpoints is compatible with many realities. having multiple realities (wherein not only is each reality equivalent to the others, but each reality is equivalent to the sum or totality of all the realities combined) is bizarre indeed, and it presents a problem for nietzsche's perspectivism because if there is only one objective reality, and all of nietzsche's mirrors, together, constitute that "the single objective reality", then each viewpoint must correspond to every mirror as well as the sum of the mirrors. in this case, epistemic relativism works at the expense of a "the single objective reality", because that reality is composed of many equivalent realities, so there is not just one "the single objective reality" -- there are two types of reality: a single objective reality (as the sum of the many equivalent realities) and the many equivalent realities. as such, since no "the single objective reality" exclusively can be determined, perspectivism fails. here is a mathematical analogy. i just previously stated that, "not only is each reality equivalent to the others, but the each reality is equivalent to the sum or totality of all the realities combined." what numbers are compatible with the aforementioned scenario? just one: zero (0 + 0 + 0 = 0). metaphysically, one could equate zero with meaning "nothing", so if reality exists as the absence of reality, then that is the only plausible scenario in which perspectivism holds as objective reality exists because there is no difference between the whole of reality and the parts -- the many equivalent realities -- that comprise it. however, this only holds up mathematically; if we take the concept of "mirrors" and have 0 (subscript 1), 0 (subscript 2), 0 (subscript n), etc., then the sum of the equivalent realities is not the same as any of the individual equivalent realities, and thus we have the problem of "the single objective reality" not being able to be determined. so now we must explore other avenues. in order for perspectivism to work -- for epistemic relativism to function with an objective reality -- then there can only be one correct corresponding viewpoint for each interaction with objective reality -- as such, reality is thus reduced to epistemology instead of a metaphysical ontology, making for an anti-realist view even if a person's epistemology correctly corresponds to an objective reality because the objective reality cannot be conceived as such. thus, nietzsche's claim for not rejecting ontological realism due to epistemic relativism is refuted: if epistemology is relative, then ontology is assumed to be as well even if in actuality it is not. however, since nietzsche has allowed for multiple realities, having each viewpoint correspond to only one reality would mean each viewpoint would correspond to a different reality, which is not only anti-realist as conceived, it is anti-realist in being actualized as exactly that since metaphysically there is no single unified ontological reality. in this case, epistemology is relative an ontology is not only assumed to be relative, it in fact is confirmed to be so. as such, nietzsche's perspectivism does not hold up.

#### Ressentiment doesn’t cause extinction

**Meltzer and Musolf 2002** [Bernard N. and Gil Richard, profs of sociology at Central Michigan University, “Resentment and Ressentiment,” Sociological Inquiry, V72 N2, Spring, 240-55]

Given this negative characterization—a prevailing evaluation—of ressentiment, it is not surprising to learn that Sartre (1965, p. 14) describes those who experience the emotion as individuals who ‘‘establish their human personality as a perpetual negation.’’ Augmenting the negative view of this emotion is a widely held view among scholars that both resentment and ressentiment tend to be base, dastardly emotions resorted to by thin-skinned individuals and seekers after excuses for failure, that these emotions are often felt irrationally, on occasions in which one has not been morally wronged. Thus, Solomon (1995) refers to a ‘‘vindictive’’ emotion, frequently a personal, petty, disproportionate reaction to a slight; Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) write of a ‘‘distasteful’’ emotion; and Adam Smith [1759] (1969) designates a ‘‘disagreeable’’ passion.7 On the other hand, Solomon (1994), elsewhere, takes a more positive view of ressentiment, pointing out that it often entails compassion for others in the same situation, and its implicit sense of injustice may lead to corrective action; thus, ressentiment can be seen as an expression of ‘‘the socially responsible insistence of the community on justice and justification’’ (p. 124). Similarly, Haber (1991) argues that resentment can be a form of personal protest that expresses regard for oneself, for others, and for the normative order (p. 48). Moreover, Haber (1991, p. 82) holds that a display of resentment may serve as an instrument of individual or social change. In fact, the historian Hippolyte Taine (cited in Jameson 1976, p. 131) sought to explain revolutions in terms of underlying ressentiment, and Jameson (1976) contends that this emotion is the very content of revolutions. In the same vein, various scholars have asserted that ‘‘the individual of ressentiment is a potential revolutionary’’ (Vaneigem 1979, p. 9) and that ‘‘our revolutionaries are men and women of resentment’’ (Solomon 1995, p. 266).8 Thus, Merton (1957, p. 155) maintains that ‘‘organized rebellion may draw upon a vast reservoir of the resentful and discontented as institutional dislocations become acute.’’ In the light of such characterizations, the role of the political agitator is readily recognized as that of raising consciousness of unjust treatment (where such consciousness is absent), inducing ressentiment (where the emotion is absent), and organizing resistance to the recurrence or continuation of unjust treatment. Moreover, Folger (1987) claims that revolutionary ideologies can help to create ressentiment. That ressentiment can be used to initiate (and sustain) revolution argues against the more passive—and contemptuous—conceptions held by Nietzsche, Scheler, and their many followers.

#### Ressentiment generates rationality – checks value to life

**Morelli 1998** [Elizabeth Murray, prof of philosophy @ Loyola Marymount, “Ressentiment and Rationality,” http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anth/AnthMore.htm]

According to Kant, the dignity and worth of a person is due to her rationality. One has worth not insofar as one acts rationally or thinks rationally, but because the law of reason is intrinsic to the self as a rational being. One may have worth a priori and yet not have any sense of self-esteem. The person of ressentiment, though, at least according to Nietzsche, is a person of pride, one who feels self-worth. And, as we have seen above, the envious person must also have a sense of self-worth in order to feel that she also deserves to possess what is possessed by the other. Thus, the person of ressentiment not only has intrinsic worth as a rational being, but also has a sense of her worth. Rationality grounds the worth of the person and, conversely, a sense of self-worth leads to rational demands for consistency. If feels oneself to be worthy—as worthy as any other, then one deserves to possess the values enjoyed by the other. If the other robs me of my prestige and power, then the other deserves to suffer. Such sentiments fuel envy and the desire for revenge. The sense of fairness, justice, proper balance at work in these feelings is rooted in the basic law of reason. The perceived injustice of the situation would have no sting if one were content with inconsistency, if one did not have within a rational exigence. The fact that in envy, the desire for revenge, and the ressentiment which may ensue the use of one's reason is partial and faulty, does not diminish the essentially rational nature of these affects.

#### Prefer util

**Isaac 02** – Professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Securing life preconditions value to life—it’s also subjective

White 90 (Alan, Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth, http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/beauty\_and\_goodness.htm, AG)

Nietzsche exhorts us to live beautifully; on this point, Nehamas and I agree. A second point of our agreement is in at­tributing to Nietzsche an insistence that the assessment of a specific life's beauty is a matter, primarily, for the individual living that life. [Continued] A post-moral world , one wherein the minotaur was silenced, would be one in which each of us could determine his or her own good; that would have to be a world within which diversity would be encouraged rather than inhibited. But that, it might seem, would entail a new form of moral dog­matism, one with the paradoxical form, "the good for all is that there be no 'good for all'"? How could Nietzsche defend such a perspective, or such affirmation, as one appropriate for everyone? How could Nietzsche defend any general position at all? With this question, I turn to what I take to be the dan­gerous part of Nehamas's response to the problem of immoralism. The problem emerges, for Nehamas, through the question, what is a bad life, if life is literature? Must we not respond, the only bad life is a boring life, a life that doesn't make a good story? Are we then to denounce or condemn the couch potato, but not the mass murderer or the child molester? At times, Nehamas seems to point us in this direction. Insisting that Nietzsche's perspec­tivism "forbids any general evaluation [of life], positive or negative," Nehamas argues: What Nietzsche eventually comes to attack directly is not any par­ticular judgment but the very tendency to make general judgments about the value of life in itself, as if there were such a single thing with a character of its own, capable of being praised or blamed by some uniform standard. [...] Life itself has no value, but the life of an individual or a group has as great a value as that individual or group can give it . Some lives are mean or hor­rible, others magnificent. Life's value depends on what one makes of it, and this is a further sense in which Nietzsche believes that value is created and not discovered. (135) This conclusion, which follows from the forbidding of any general evaluation of life, is, it seems to me, as dangerous in its implications as any of Nietzsche's "words of war," any of his "thunder and fireworks." If "life itself has no value," and if "some lives are mean and horrible," then those who strive to live beautifully need take no account of those whose lives they deem, on whatever basis, to be ugly. "Some lives," Nehamas tells us, "are mean or horrible." I agree, but only if we read Nehamas as asserting that some lives have been mean or horrible. This correction is vital, for no life can be simply "mean or horrible" until it is over. The life that appears, as it develops, to be simply "mean or horrible" may be a life whose beauty has not yet emerged. As Nietzsche notes in what he calls "a parable," "Not every end is a goal. A melody's end is not its goal; nevertheless, so long as the melody has not reached its end, it also has not reached its goal" (HHII:WS:204). Perhaps Nehamas is right in asserting that Nietzsche's perspectivism "forbids any general evaluation [of life], positive or negative"; yet, I have argued, Nietzsche attempts to develop a "general" perspective of life, he attempts to see life as it really is. The lenses of art are not the only lenses we need; Nietzsche exhorts us to view art through the lenses of life. One of the things we see through the lenses of life is that no final evaluation of a life can be made until, at least, the life is over. To say that a life still underway is simply "mean and horrible" is not to express a justifiable opinion, it is to judge prematurely. Nietzsche's parable, which presents life as melody rather than as literature, provides a basis for rejecting the inhumanity seemingly licensed by the simple classification of some lives as "mean or horrible"; yet it may intensify the problem that led to that classification, for it may also seem to provide further sup­port for the claim that the life of the child molester or serial murderer can be a life that is beautiful. Even if we agree that child molestation is simply ugly, does it follow that a life that has included child molestation must be ugly? That there can be no objection to the execution of the child molester? A different way to put the question is this: can suicide be noble? Would the life of the pale criminal attain its highest beauty if the pale criminal were to kill himself? Granting that nothing the pale criminal may do following his crime will suffice to make his life, as a whole, one to be emulated -- one cannot , I think, will to commit a crime for the sole purpose of then being able to overcome that crime -- we must also recognize that the question that faces the pale criminal himself is not, "would I want others to act as I have acted?" Nor is his question the one posed by Nehamas, i.e., "would I want to do the same things all over again?" His question, rather, is, what now ? What is to be the significance of this murder, which I myself deem repellent, within my life as it continues to develop? Is this calamity to destroy me, or rather, perhaps, to be the basis for my transforma­tion? We approximate the situation the pale criminal is in if we ask ourselves whether we might think better of him, perhaps even be inspired by him, if, instead of committing suicide, he were to seek to help others to learn from his example. Phrasing the question in terms of suicide indicates that the earlier formulation is too simple. Just as accounts are neither simply true nor simply false, lives are neither simply beautiful or noble nor simply ugly or base. Lives are more or less beauti­ful, and as long as any life continues, it can, in principle, con­tinue to transform the initial ugliness, if there be such, of its past.

#### Even if suffering’s inevitable in the status quo, compassion can alleviate it and make life meaningful

Stan Van Hooft, The Hastings Center, “The Meanings of Suffering,” The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 28, No. 5, (Sep. - Oct., 1998), pp. 17-19

Nietzsche praises suffering as the means whereby a higher order of hu- manity will evolve. Nietzsche strong-ly disparaged pleasure and comfort as goals of human life. He hated utilitar- ianism, thinking it a doctrine that gave moral worth to the satisfaction of desire for its own sake. Rather, he admired what he saw as the overcom- ing of our human natures by way of it shows that the person fails to ap- preciate the positive power of suffer- ing, and it belittles the object of pity because it represents that person as failing to bear suffering courageously Pity goes hand in hand with the de- sire for comfort, thought Nietzsche, The challenge of postmodern authenticity is to refuse the false consolations of theodicies or metaphysical theories that make suffering positive. effort and striving. He admired com- mitment and dedication and the will- ingness to put up with hardship and pain in the pursuit of a noble goal and in particular, in the fulfillment of our existential quest for self-affirma- tion and self-assertion. He saw this quest as leading to a newer and better kind of human being. But this being who would overcome mere humanity would not emerge if we focused only on comfort and the avoidance of suf- fering. The avoidance of pain and amelioration of suffering were forces of decadence that led to the softening of the human spirit and a loss of focus upon the task of self-overcom- ing, which was essential to human advancement. Suffering was the cru- cible in which a higher form of hu- manity could be forged. Nietzsche's view is attractive. It is implicitly accepted by nations that define their identity through the suf- fering and sacrifice of their founding fathers or war heroes,13 as Australia does with its annual celebration of a major military defeat on Anzac Day. In at least one respect, too, Nietzsche's view is similar to the view of some Christians, since it embraces suffering as a sacrifice for a higher goal. Indeed, Nietzsche's view might seem noble were it not for his further view about pity. Nietzsche thought that pity be- littles the person who feels it as well as the person who is its object. It be- littles the person who feels it because and should be repudiated on that ac- count. But if the rejection of pity constitutes a rejection of compassion, then Nietzsche should himself be re- pudiated. So understood, Nietzsche comes to seem callous and uncaring. [..]Whether this way of thinking would allow us to embrace the suffer- ing that is inflicted by disease or acci- dent, the suffering that is not part of our life's plan, is perhaps still doubt- ful. Useless suffering in the face of which we are passive might continue to be meaningless in terms of our life's goals. Or it might be embraced as the test of our mettle, the ultimate ordeal of our existential faith and commitment might be tested. Whether one is a Christian who sees suffering as part of God's salvific plan for humanity, or a hu- manist who thinks that suffering grounds the possibility of ethics through compassion, or a Stoic who maintains an indifference to suffer- ing as something morally irrelevant, or a Nietzschean who holds that suf- fering ennobles the human spirit and makes possible human advancement and personal self-validation, the per- ennial and inescapable question of the one who suffers is, Why me? But rather than seek an answer to that question, we should ask, in the spirit of Nietzsche, why we want an answer to it. The challenge of postmodern authenticity is to sever the link be- tween suffering and justice. It is to accept the blindness of fate and the inevitability of bad luck. It is to refuse the false consolations of theo- dicies or metaphysical theories that make suffering positive. Suffering is to be borne. There is nothing more to it. The only question remaining about this way of thinking would be whether it could give rise to compas-sion for the suffering of others. That is, even if we reject the ancient and Christian attempts to accept suffer- ing, we should try to incorporate some part of Levinas's humanistic in- sight. And this seems possible. Inso- far as suffering is borne, it opens us to the suffering of others. Indeed, at- tempts to make suffering good blind us to the reality of our and of others' suffering by allowing us to view it as something that ought to happen or that ought to be accepted. Cruelty and insensitivity lie down this path. The tragic bearing of suffering, on the other hand, awakens us to its real- ity. If neither the gods, the cosmos, providence, nor a faith in human progress rob suffering of its tragedy, then we are left just with the brute fact that we and others suffer. And in this there is community. Our own suffering awakens us to what the other is going through and thus cre- ates in us the compassion through which relieving actions can be moti- vated. In this community of suffer- ing, a meaning might yet be found for our own suffering. Perhaps all the meaning that suffering can have is that it teaches us to care for others.

#### Just because neither of our perspectives represent absolute truth doesn't mean that you're prohibited from deeming one contextually preferable given how we have debated it. We never claimed our perspective was true, rather it is based on a contingency of the debate flow, as is all debate-Truth -- it's true insofar as we win our argument. That means if we win something they said is bad there's no reason this role of the ballot argument should matter

**Shankar '11** Twishmay, Nietzsche enthusiast "Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Perspectivism" <http://twishmay.com/philosophy/nietzsche%E2%80%99s-philosophy-of-perspectivism/>

**An important paradox which emerges with respect to Perspectivism concerns the fact that perspectivism and the other philosophies of Nietzsche form a perspective in themself. Thus it cannot really be stated as the absolute truth. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s other philosophies such as those concerning eternal return and the ubermen seem to have been expressed as if they are universal truths. However, the very idea of such a truth is not possible within the framework of perspectivism**. Nietzsche foresees this contradiction in his work and thus portrays perspectivism not as an absolute true theory but “a way of life”. **In fact, perspectivism can be thought of as a philosophy which teaches us how to live our lives in the absence of any absolute perspectives.** We can understand this further by realizing that as Nietzsche said – **“truth is the kind of error without which a certain being could not live”. He thus assumes that even if there is no certain truth or absolute perspective, we as human beings need to act as if there were one.** Thus the very notion of truth arises out of this idea, where, although there is no absolute truth, humans rely on certain facts considering them to be universal and objective for their satisfaction in their regular experiences of life. He writes – “The falseness of a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgement. The question is to what extent it is life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserving, and perhaps even species-breeding” Another way we can justify this explanation of the perspectivism and Nietzsche’s other philosophies being an ‘attitude towards life’ by saying that while there is no absolute truth, there may be different levels of truthfulness. Thus perspectives can be compared with each other and there may be some perspectives which are better than others. **While perspectives cannot be evaluated based on any external reality, they may very well be arranged in a hierarchy based on their usage in a particular context.**

#### You shouldn't get points for just having an opinion, nor for arguing that every reason for action is equally valid – vote neg on presumption – Jimi Durkee, in an undergrad paper for MSU explains at some unspecified previous date:

In response to Quintana’s pre-game guarantees of victory, **the Dude quips,** “Well, **you know, that’s just like, your opinion, man**” (BL). **When considering the limits of this film, we must take this Nietzschean lesson into account. Whatever you are on the grand stage of nihilism, Nietzsche explains that your own position will structure how you understand the world around you**. As a result, one must go through the entire nihilistic process in order to be able to read the film *from that perspective*: Suppose we realize how the world may no longer be interpreted in terms of these three categories, and that the world begins to become valueless for us after this insight: then we have to ask about the sources of our faith in these three categories. Let us try if it is not possible to give up our faith in them. **Once we have devaluated these three categories, the demonstration that they cannot be applied to the universe is no longer any reason for devaluating the universe** (WP, 13). A movie cannot tell you how to think; only you can make sense of the movie. This is precisely why there are so many different explanations and interpretations of the “meaning” of the film[[1]](https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1" \l "13cc988f639395ac__ftn1" \o ")[8]. This is because our *perspective* limits the horizon of possibilities for interpreting the film (text, world). Still, such a reading is not entirely without value—for if this charge were good enough to defeat it, then one would have to ask: **Why read Nietzsche? What is the point, if all that matters is that we each go through nihilism ourselves? Why did Nietzsche write? The point is that Nietzsche still must rely on some faith that his writing has power, that metaphors do not simply *explain* the world, *qua* scientific rationality, but have the power to *change* the world, albeit via the affirmation of life as mere process. And, if nothing else, comedy is life-affirming, and Nietzsche can’t argue with that.**

## 2nc framework

### Overview/Lasch

#### Our ground disad means their convictions are presumptively false because they aren’t amenable to direct contestation

**Lasch 95** (Christopher, Social Critic and Author, “The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy”, p. 170-171)

THE ROLE OF the press, as Lippmann saw it, was to circulate information, not to encourage argument. The relationship between information and argument was antagonistic, not complementary. He did not take the position that reliable information was a necessary precondition of argument; on the contrary, his point was that information precluded argument, made argument unnecessary. Arguments were what took place in the absence of reliable information. Lippmann had forgotten what he learned (or should have learned) from William James and John Dewey: that our search for reliable information is itself guided by the questions that arise during arguments about a given course of action. It is only by subjecting our preferences and projects to the test of debate that we come to understand what we know and what we still need to learn. Until we have to defend our opinions in public, they remain opinions in Lippmann's pejorative sense—half-formed convictions based on random impressions and unexamined assumptions. It is the act of articulating and defending our views that lifts them out of the category of "opinions," gives them shape and definition, and makes it possible for others to recognize them as a description of their own experience as well. In short, we come to know our own minds only by explaining ourselves to others. The attempt to bring others around to our own point of view carries the risk, of course, that we may adopt their point of view instead. We have to enter imaginatively into our opponents' arguments, if only for the purpose of refuting them, and we may end up being persuaded by those we sought to persuade. Argument is risky and unpredictable, therefore educational. Most of us tend to think of it (as Lippmann thought of it) as a clash of rival dogmas, a shouting match in which neither side gives any ground. But arguments are not won by shouting down opponents. They are won by changing opponents' minds—something that can happen only if we give opposing arguments a respectful hearing and still persuade their advocates that there is something wrong with those arguments. In the course of this activity we may well decide that there is something wrong with our own.

#### Aesthetic appreciation of wind farms should only proceed on the BASIS of their POLICY IMPACT

Saito 5

<http://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=321>

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One may then ask whether it is wise to decide on the environmental value or disvalue of something and adapt our aesthetic sensibility to it, when it may possibly be subject to revision. This raises an important question, particularly in environmental aesthetics, because so much of our aesthetic evaluation seems to be dependent upon what we perceive to be the object's social, political, and environmental value. An extreme skepticism would render any aesthetic evaluation impossible, because we can never have omniscient knowledge regarding all possible future ramifications. However, is it the most reasonable stance to take the position that we should never engage in assigning aesthetic values, positive or negative, to any objects that have possible ramifications, environmental or otherwise? This would be similar to making it impossible for us to decide or act on anything because we can never have complete knowledge about all the possible consequences of the contemplated action, because, as a good Cartesian would claim, nothing is indubitable except for Cogito. However, there has to be a middle ground between reckless disregard or complete ignorance and omniscience, and we conduct our everyday lives, decision-making processes, and academic pursuits on that middle ground, that is, on the basis of best available evidence. Such extreme skepticism would certainly impoverish our aesthetic life, as well as depriving us of the opportunity to tap into the power of aesthetic persuasion that I will discuss shortly. But Boone's critique is valid insofar as it is a cautionary warning for us to educate us with available materials and data before formulating an aesthetic judgment. I believe that our aesthetic estimation of an object is subject to modification and **revision with newer findings**, just like everything else. We cannot but change our perception and judgment of a painting if it turns out to be a forgery. Similarly, once we are educated about the environmental harm resulting from maintaining a velvety-smooth, weeds-free, green carpet lawn, our attraction to the lawn will never be the same (although I don't think it will make it ugly all of a sudden, either). In a sense, our aesthetic perception is fragile, vulnerable to influenced by associated facts, or to borrow David Suzuki's phrase, "we see beauty through filters shaped by our values and beliefs."[14] So, although I currently hold the windfarm project in the positive light and hence argue for its positive aesthetic value, I do reserve the possibility of revision and modification if new, unexpected harms inherent in the technology and structure were to occur or be discovered in the future. At the same time, it seems to me that the same reserved attitude should be advised for all parties to the debate.

#### Fairness is key to fun—and that’s a good thing

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So fun — in the sense of enjoyment and pleasure — puts us in a relaxed, receptive frame of mind for learning. Play, in addition to providing pleasure, increases our involvement, which also helps us learn. Both “fun” and “play” however, have the disadvantage of being somewhat abstract, unstructured, and hard-to-define concepts. But there exists a more formal and structured way to harness (and unleash) all the power of fun and play in the learning process — the powerful institution of games. Before we look specifically at how we can combine games with learning, let us examine games themselves in some detail. Like fun and play, game is a word of many meanings and implications. How can we define a game? Is there any useful distinction between fun, play and games? What makes games engaging? How do we design them? Games are a subset of both play and fun. In programming jargon they are a “child”, inheriting all the characteristics of the “parents.” They therefore carry both the good and the bad of both terms. Games, as we will see, also have some special qualities, which make them particularly appropriate and well suited for learning. So what is a game? Like play, game, has a wide variety of meanings, some positive, some negative. On the negative side there is mocking and jesting, illegal and shady activity such as a con game, as well as the “fun and games” that we saw earlier. As noted, these can be sources of resistance to Digital Game-Based Learning — “we are not playing games here.” But much of that is semantic. What we are interested in here are the meanings that revolve around the definition of games involving rules, contest, rivalry and struggle. What Makes a Game a Game? Six Structural Factors The Encyclopedia Britannica provides the following diagram of the relation between play and games: 35 PLAY spontaneous play organized play (GAMES) noncompetitive games competitive games (CONTESTS) intellectual contests physical contests (SPORTS) Our goal here is to understand why games engage us, drawing us in often in spite of ourselves. This powerful force stems first from the fact that they are a form of fun and play, and second from what I call the six key structural elements of games: 1. Rules 2. Goals and Objectives 3. Outcomes & Feedback 4. Conflict/Competition/Challenge/Opposition 5. Interaction, and 6. Representation or Story. There are thousands, perhaps millions of different games, but all contain most, if not all, these powerful factors. Those that don’t contain all the factors are still classified as games by many, but can also belong to other subclasses described below. In addition to these structural factors, there are also important design elements that add to engagement and distinguish a really good game from a poor or mediocre one. Let us discuss these six factors in detail and show how and why they lead to such strong engagement. Rules are what differentiate games from other kinds of play. Probably the most basic definition of a game is that it is organized play, that is to say rule-based. If you don’t have rules you have free play, not a game. Why are rules so important to games? Rules impose limits – they force us to take specific paths to reach goals and ensure that all players take the same paths. They put us inside the game world, by letting us know what is in and out of bounds. What spoils a game is not so much the cheater, who accepts the rules but doesn’t play by them (we can deal with him or her) but the nihilist, who denies them altogether. Rules make things both fair and exciting. When the Australians “bent” the rules of the America’s Cup and built a huge boat in 1988, and the Americans found a way to compete with a catamaran, it was still a race — but no longer the same game.

### A2 t = arbitrary

#### All definitions are somewhat arbitrary, but this proves limits are key. The only solution is contesting reasonable interpretations of terms—means T debates solve their offense

**Kemerling 97** (Garth, professor of philosophy at Newberry College, http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm)

We've seen that sloppy or misleading use of ordinary language can seriously limit our ability to create and communicate correct reasoning. As philosopher John Locke pointed out three centuries ago, the achievement of human knowledge is often hampered by the use of words without fixed signification. **Needless controversy is** sometimes **produced** and perpetuated by an unacknowledged ambiguity in the application of key terms. We can distinguish disputes of three sorts: Genuine disputes involve disagreement about whether or not some specific proposition is true. Since the people engaged in a genuine dispute agree on the meaning of the words by means of which they convey their respective positions, each of them can propose and assess logical arguments that might eventually lead to a resolution of their differences. Merely verbal disputes, on the other hand, arise entirely from ambiguities in the language used to express the positions of the disputants. A verbal dispute disappears entirely once the people involved arrive at an agreement on the meaning of their terms, since doing so reveals their underlying agreement in belief. Apparently verbal but really genuine disputes can also occur, of course. In cases of this sort, the resolution of every ambiguity only reveals an underlying genuine dispute. Once that's been discovered, it can be addressed fruitfully by appropriate methods of reasoning. We can save a lot of time, sharpen our reasoning abilities, and communicate with each other more effectively if we watch for disagreements about the meaning of words and try to resolve them whenever we can. Kinds of Definition The most common way of preventing or eliminating differences in the use of languages is by agreeing on the definition of our terms. Since these explicit accounts of the meaning of a word or phrase can be offered in distinct contexts and employed in the service of different goals, it's useful to distinguish definitions of several kinds: A lexical definition simply reports the way in which a term is already used within a language community. The goal here is to inform someone else of the accepted meaning of the term, so the definition is more or less correct depending upon the accuracy with which it captures that usage. In these pages, my definitions of technical terms of logic are lexical because they are intended to inform you about the way in which these terms are actually employed within the discipline of logic. At the other extreme, a stipulative definition freely assigns meaning to a completely new term, creating a usage that had never previously existed. Since the goal in this case is to propose the adoption of shared use of a novel term, there are no existing standards against which to compare it, and the definition is always correct (though it might fail to win acceptance if it turns out to be inapt or useless). If I now decree that we will henceforth refer to Presidential speeches delivered in French as "glorsherfs," I have made a (probably pointless) stipulative definition. Combining these two techniques is often an effective way to reduce the vagueness of a word or phrase. These precising definitions begin with the lexical definition of a term but then propose to **sharpen it by stipulating more narrow limits** on its use. Here, the lexical part must be correct and the stipulative portion should appropriately reduce the troublesome vagueness. If the USPS announces that "proper notification of a change of address" means that an official form containing the relevant information must be received by the local post office no later than four days prior to the effective date of the change, it has offered a (possibly useful) precising definition.

### A2 slave morality

#### Their framework of radical openness is the ultimate slave morality. Using Nietzsche to defend inclusion all perspectives is a misreading that links to their offense

**Colaner 2008** – professor of philosophy at the University of Seattle (11/13, Nathan, paper presented at the annual meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association, “Strange Bedfellows: A Nietzschean Defense of Conservative Republicanism”, p. 8-12, http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/7/6/7/1/p276716\_index.htmlphpsessid=f8550ba4ffe78566175e73d029186240)

In addition to misunderstanding Nietzsche’s critique of human rights, Hatab has also misunderstood Nietzsche’s critique of democracy. This is an important observation, because even if my previous argument stands, Hatab could possibly still advocate for his version of democracy without any notion of rights at all. Nietzsche announces his distaste for democracy in the first line of the section “What is Noble” in Beyond Good and Evil. He says that “Every enhancement of the type “man” has so far been the work of an aristocratic society – and it will be so again and again…” (BGE 201). Nietzsche thinks of an aristocratic society as the starkest contrast to a democratic society, and he cashes out 8 the difference in terms of how the two societies understand and incorporate “the two basic types” (BGE 204) of valuers and their different basic set of values. He variously calls one group the masters or nobles (whom he honors with the section title), and the other group the slaves. The values of the master begin when the master observes the difference between his “proud and exalted” soul, and “those in whom the opposite of such exalted, proud states find expression” (BGE 204). He and his caste are good, and the members of the other caste are bad. It is important that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are not moral terms here, but simple empirical generalizations: “one feels contempt for the cowardly, the anxious, the petty,….those who humble themselves…” (BGE 204-5). This is not a contempt that stems from condemnation, but a contempt that arises naturally when the beautiful looks upon the base. Nietzsche indicates that highlighting this version of the good/bad distinction “is most alien and embarrassing to the present taste…” (BGE 206), but only because the ‘present taste’ apparently chooses to ignore the obvious. This first type of morality is contrasted with slave morality, which at first recognizes the same distinction between the higher and lower types of human beings. Initially, the conclusions are mirror images, for not only does noble despise the slave, but “The slave’s eye is not favorable to the virtues of the powerful” (BGE 207). However, there is a pattern to slave thinking that ends badly. Slaves scrape by, thinking only of how to endure “the pressure of existence” (BGE 207). As such, the slave has developed some very useful skills, such as “the warm heart, patience, industry, humility, and friendliness…” (BGE 207). They are so useful, in fact, that he begins to call them ‘good.’ Next, the slaves observe that the higher human beings usually lack these sorts of traits, 9 and so the noble acquires, for the first time, a moral label: ‘evil.’ What the slave doesn’t realize, however, is that the noble does not need or want, for example, the value of humility, because this is only a useful trait for a weak person to adopt who cannot defend himself. And so it is that the healthy distinction between a good human being and a bad one in the eye of the noble gets degraded in two ways: it is reversed, such that good becomes bad, and the value-neutral term ‘bad’ is replaced with ‘evil.’ We are now in position to understand Nietzsche’s hatred of democracy, and why he believes that aristocracies always have had and always will have the only chance to better the human race: in an aristocracy, the natural good/bad distinction is preserved, and in a democracy, that distinction gets perverted. Hatab has focused on Nietzsche’s rejection of the Enlightenment individual as a basis for his rejection of democracy, but “What is Noble” expresses a much deeper antipathy for democracy. The problem here is not any particular conception of the self, but rather that some, or most, or nearly all people simply do not deserve to be heard. Democracy comes from the Greek words for “power” and “people,” and so a democracy is literally a system of government in which the people are in power, which is an enormous problem for Nietzsche, because not everyone is capable of handling power9. It is no secret that according to Nietzsche, bad things happen when the weak are permitted to articulate and promote their values. If we can take these passages in this way, Hatab’s interpretation of an acceptable agonistic democracy becomes unlikely. Because of Nietzsche’s theoretical worries in Beyond Good and Evil that are substantiated by the historical events he describes in the Genealogy10, we have good reason to worry that the idea that all perspectives must be heard and respected and must10 compete with one another in fair contests is the opposite idea that Nietzsche had in mind. Despite the chorus from the Nietzsche apologists such as Hatab, this elitist line of thinking cannot be excised from Nietzsche’s thought. Contempt for the slaves and their morality is what loosed Nietzsche’s tongue, inspired his career, and kept him writing and creating through his famous migraines. §7. Hatab’s Misunderstanding of Perspectivism This observation also shows that Hatab’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s notion of perspectivism cannot be right. Hatab’s failure can be further demonstrated by highlighting his unsatisfactory summary of the implications of perspectivism: “Even Nietzsche’s advocacy of his own perspective regarding higher types and such – which he admits is itself only a perspective among others and not “the truth” – would not lend support to his apparent confidence in an aristocratic order and authoritarian rule” (NDD 162). The question for Hatab is “Why not?” Hatab does not explain his position any further, except to repeat his claim that Nietzsche’s perspective “is only a perspective,” and therefore “would find no warrant for establishing itself” (NDD 162). In Hatab’s notes on the value of education in the agonistic society, he says that “I am trying to unsettle Nietzsche’s apparent aristocratic confidence by pointing his own critique of truth back at that confidence” (NDD 129). Hatab’s comments are made all the more troubling because he himself argues that Nietzsche’s perspectivism does not amount to “crude relativism” because of the importance of “Nietzsche’s frequent judgments of so-called life-denying perspectives in favor of life-affirming perspectives” (NDD 146). Hatab’s claim is that perspectivism announces that there are no perspectives that 11 are closer to the truth than any others, and as a corollary, that no perspective is farther from the truth than any other. Thus, what is required is respect for all perspectives, which occurs best in the argumentative space that is opened up by an agonistic democracy. He takes Nietzsche quite seriously when Nietzsche says that “…the more eyes…we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity,’ be” (GM 119). Hatab takes this statement to mean ‘**the more perspectives, the merrier**.’ But Nietzsche (characteristically) does not follow this passage with an explanation of this provocative statement, and so the only hermeneutically responsible thing to do is to interpret these three lines of text in such a way that they do not conflict wildly with every other word that Nietzsche penned. Therefore, this passage must be referring to the perspectives of the nobles, not perspectives in general, because as Nietzsche never tires of saying, more slave perspectives merely destroy life. But **since Hatab’s** whole **thesis hangs on the idea that** the kind of **freedom** and independence **that is a** transcendental **condition of arguing one’s perspective is for everyone, his** Nietzschean **defense** of democracy **cannot stand**. We should let Nietzsche’s own words put the final nail in the coffin: “Independence is for the very few; it is a privilege of the strong” (BGE 41).

**Ethics in an absurd world demands that we enter into mutual discussion of the consequences of institutionalized values and accept that we may be wrong through constructive argument on fair terms – this commitment to democratic dialogue, embodied in debate over specific policy proposals and the consideration of their results rather than clashing ideologies, is all that can save us from authoritarianism, nihilism, and extinction**

David **Spritzen** 19**88** – Prof philosophy @ U Long Island; *Camus: A Critical Introduction*; note – we reject the use of gendered language in this evidence; p 266-267

If there is an absolute for Camus, it is an absolute of evidence grounded in human possibilities. It is an absolute given; its significance remains hypothetical and nonexclusive with respect to others, but it defines the range of our commitment. If experience is to prove fruitful, thought must be relativized and corrigible. “Persuasion demands leisure,” observes Camus, “and friendship a structure that will never be completed.” (R, 247). We are recalled once again to the definition of dialogue: an open inquiry among persons. The persons are the basic unit; the inquiry seeks to achieve and to maintain guidelines for interaction; while the openness refers to the recognition and acceptance of the permanent possibility of novelty entering into human experience. **The political problem therefore becomes that of seeking to** **institutionalize**, first, **the method of inquiry; and** second, **its always provisional and pragmatically considered results**. The freedom, dignity, and growth of the person, and the collectivity are the reference points and limits of action. **To pose the problems outside these limits is to remove the discussion from the ethical dimension**. The institutionalization of the method of dialogue just referred to is what Camus means by democracy. He has written: “Justice implies rights. Rights imply the liberty to defend them. In order to act, man has to speak. We know what we are defending…I am speaking for a society which does not impose silence.” (A/I, 229) Such an act requires a commitment to values that transcend the purely political. **The commitment to democracy is at bottom just such a politically transcending commitment to the human community**. “**The democrat, after all, is the one who admits that the adversary may be right, who permits him to express himself, and who agrees to reflect upon his arguments**.” (A/I, 125) What is fundamental is not any specific political society or set of laws by which it may be given constitutional embodiment. These structures are no more fundamental than the concepts we use to regulate our lives. The actual basis of such arrangements is to be found in the experience of community, which is essentially the experience of unity – that is, the felt communality of actions grounded in common practices and common perceptions of meaning. Where we have the core notion of community: shared meaningful activity through time. Its method of communication through reciprocal approximation and mutual development of meanings in response to novel experiences is what is meant by dialogue. “We must be fought today is fear and silence, and with them, the separation of minds and souls which accompanies them. What must be defended is dialogue and universal communication among men. Servitude, injustices, lies are the curses (les fléaux) which break this communication and prevent dialogue. (A/I, 177) Speaking of the principles revealed by revolt, which provide the basis for dialogue, Camus sums up much of the thesis in these words: “Nothing justifies the assertion that these principles have existed eternally; it is of no use to declare that they will one day exist. But they do exist, in the very period in which we exist. With us, and throughout history, they deny **servitude, falsehood, and terror**.” There is, in fact, nothing in common between a master and a slave; it is impossible to communicate with a person who has been reduced to servitude. Instead of the implicit and untrammeled dialogue through which we come to recognize our similarity and consecrate our destiny, servitude gives sway to the most terrible of silences. If injustice is bad for the rebel, it is not because it contradicts an eternal idea of justice, but because it perpetuates the silent hostility that separates the oppressor from the oppressed. It kills the small part of existence that can be realized on this earth through the mutual understanding of men…the mutual understanding and communication discovered by rebellion can survive only in free exchange of conversation. **Every ambiguity, every misunderstanding, leads to death**; clear language and simple words are the only salvation from this death. The climax of every tragedy lies in the deafness of its heroes. Plato is right and not Moses and Nietzsche. Dialogue on the level of mankind is less costly than the gospel preached by totalitarian regimes in the form of a monologue dictated from the top of a lonely mountain. **On the stage as in reality, the monologue precedes death.** (R, 283-4). **Dialogue** grounded in truth and integrity **is all that can protect us from the despair of nihilism in a world that offers no meaning beyond what we can conjointly construct**. “We have a right to think,” Camus wrote a year or two before he died, “that truth with a capital letter is relative. But facts are facts. And whoever says that the sky is blue when it is grey is prostituting words and preparing the way for tyranny. This is not so much an implied theory of knowledge as a statement of the moral role of intelligence. The question of Truth becomes derivative; the importance of truths for experience, fundamental. Intelligence must bear witness to the facts of existence. It must disintoxicate politics, as an essential condition for maintaining dialogue.

**The Aff’s methodology turns their value to life claims – their orientation toward monologue devalues opposing positions and justifies the worst forms of violent extermination**

David **Spritzen** 19**88** – Prof philosophy @ U Long Island; *Camus: A Critical Introduction*; note – we reject the use of gendered language in this evidence, p 254

Those who, as Camus noted, were sure of themselves because they represented an ideology were in fact abstractions, individuals who identified people not as that specific complex of qualities and tendencies concretely encountered, but simply as the bearers of this or that view on the important questions. The encounter with others therefore cannot take place as between particular persons but only as between those for or against. **Since only our theoretical positions matter, those with whom we disagree clearly have lost their value**.3 The claim is the following. The possibility of dialogue is destroyed as soon as a claim to the Truth, and to the privileged insight upon which it must ultimately be based, insists upon public recognition. Any metaphysical claim that Truth is the only basis for public policy would seem to be implicitly just such a tyrannical act. The abstract conclusion having replaced the concrete inquirer as the ultimate value, the latter is logically (and eventually, no doubt, concretely) reduced to an appendage whose opinion *per se* is of no value: It is transitional and purely instrumental, at best; dispensable, at worst. A human situation—the encounter of persons in search of an ever corrigible way of living together—is thus replaced by confrontation in which one attempts to make Truth, privately arrived at, hold public sway by brute force. The dialectally inevitable result of such an insistence should be clear. The concept of constructive opposition has here been outlived. No wonder that an individual so possessed is to be feared. It would be difficult to make this point more forcefully than does Camus: There is no life without dialogue. And over the largest part of the world dialogue today has been replaced by polemic. . . . But what is the mechanism of polemic? It involves considering the adversary as an enemy, consequently in simplifying him and in refusing to see him. I am no longer aware of the character or the appearance of the man whom I insult, nor whether he happens to smile, and in what manner. Having become three-fourths blind thanb to polemic, **we no longer live among men, but in a world of silhouettes**.

### A2 uncreative

#### No link to rules or predictability bad—our argument isn't rules-based in the sense they identify, it’s a set of contestable guidelines for evaluating competitions. Rejecting the topic because rules are oppressive doesn’t solve and only a standard like the resolution is limited enough to enable preparation and testing but has enough internal complexity to solve their impact

**Armstrong 2K** – Paul B. Armstrong, Professor of English and Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, Winter 2000, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser's Aesthetic Theory,” New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 211-223

\*aleatory = depending on luck, i.e. the throw of a die

Such a play-space also opposes the notion that the only alternative to the coerciveness of consensus must be to advocate the sublime powers of rule-breaking.8 Iser shares Lyotard’s concern that to privilege harmony and agreement in a world of heterogeneous language games is to limit their play and to inhibit semantic innovation and the creation of new games. Lyotard’s endorsement of the “sublime”—the pursuit of the “unpresentable” by rebelling against restrictions, defying norms, and smashing the limits of existing paradigms—is undermined by contradictions, however, which Iser’s explication of play recognizes and addresses. The paradox of the unpresentable, as Lyotard acknowledges, is that it can only be manifested through a game of representation. The sublime is, consequently, in Iser’s sense, an instance of doubling. If violating norms creates new games, this crossing of boundaries **depends on** and carries in its wake the conventions and structures it oversteps. The sublime may be uncompromising, asocial, and unwilling to be bound by limits, but its pursuit of what is not contained in any order or system makes it dependent on the forms it opposes. ¶ The radical presumption of the sublime is not only terroristic in refusing to recognize the claims of other games whose rules it declines to limit itself by. It is also naive and self-destructive in its impossible imagining that it can do without the others it opposes. As a structure of doubling, the sublime pursuit of the unpresentable requires a play-space that includes other, less radical games with which it can interact. Such conditions of exchange would be provided by the nonconsensual reciprocity of Iserian play. ¶ Iser’s notion of play offers a way of conceptualizing power which acknowledges the necessity and force of disciplinary constraints without seeing them as unequivocally coercive and determining. The contradictory combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Iser’s analysis of “regulatory” and “aleatory” rules. Even the regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a game, “permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . Since these rules limit the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion, and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own” (FI 273). Submitting to the discipline of regulatory restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not codified as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a game and another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more flexible and openended and more susceptible to variation than regulatory rules, but they too are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and possibility, limitation and unpredictability, discipline and spontaneity.

## 2nc t

### T – restrictions

#### Scenery is one of a list of impacts that the Forest Service COULD use to review wind projects – but it’s not codified in the regulation. They allow any action the Forest Service takes from its own discretion to be topical

Tidwell, 11

[Thomas L. Forest Service Chief, 08/04/2011, "Final Directives for Forest Service Wind Energy Special Use Authorizations, Forest Service Manual 2720, Forest Service Handbooks 2609.13 and 2709.11"

<https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2011/08/04/2011-19673/final-directives-for-forest-service-wind-energy-special-use-authorizations-forest-service-manual>, accessed 10-29-12, AFB]

Response to Comments on FSM 2726

Comment. One respondent recommended adding recreation and scenic impacts to the list of detrimental impacts to be minimized, so that FSM 2726 would provide for minimizing detrimental social, recreational, scenic, and environmental impacts, including direct, indirect and cumulative impacts.

Response. Proposed and final FSM 2726 do not provide a list of detrimental impacts to be minimized. Nevertheless, impacts on recreation and scenery will be analyzed at the site-specific project level as appropriate.

## 1nr ugliness

### Overview

#### Affirming ugliness is the only way to solve Nietzsche’s aesthetics – more life-affirming than beauty

Williams 2k7 (Peter, “Emerging from a Cave: Examining an Aspect of Nietzsche’s Paradoxical Aesthetics” <http://mysticwon.xanga.com/631447576/item/>)

Considering that the ‘aesthetic state’ was a revitalized expression used often by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), particularly in the posthumously published notebook The Will to Power, it is useful to re-establish the framework in which the concept has already been thoroughly elucidated by Nietzsche himself.[i] Much of Nietzsche’s late philosophy clearly expresses the notion of the aesthetic state to be of utmost importance if human beings are to find the smallest semblance of meaning in anything at all after the announcement of “the death of God.” [ii] The most captivating feature of Nietzsche’s philosophy centers on his aesthetics. He viewed art as the only thing that could still liberate civilization after the advent of European nihilism. Nietzsche bluntly put it this way: “We possess art, lest we perish of the truth!” (435). The truth to which he referred was an extremely pessimistic view of reality conceived by a man whom he had grown to greatly admire while studying classical philology in his early years at the University of Leipzig. That man, who Nietzsche saw as a surrogate father figure after his own father died while he was very young, was Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860). In The World as Will and Representation (1819) Schopenhauer argued that in order to end the will’s constant striving for things it cannot possibly obtain, one should withdraw from the world and contemplate natural and artistic beauty. This withdrawing, or withholding, is what Nietzsche eventually saw as the root of a nihilistic worldview and the ressentiment that accompanies it. Here he saw an opening to formulate a point of departure for his own aesthetic position to take shape which after mature development became the ideas expressed in the notebook we now know as The Will to Power, in the section devoted to beauty and art entitled ‘The Will to Power as Art.’ Nietzsche saw the existential problem the will poses on aesthetic introspection very differently than Schopenhauer’s “scandalous misunderstanding when he took art for a bridge to the denial of life” (430). He vehemently opposed the Schopenhauerean idea of contemplating beauty as means for withdrawing from the natural, physical world because he saw it as a concept which negated existential meaning. In characteristically polemical fashion Nietzsche targeted Schopenhauer’s narrow understanding of aesthetics by defining states of ugliness: “Inartistic states: those of objectivity, mirroring, suspended will…those who become impoverished, withdraw, grow pale; under whose eye life suffers” (430). In this light Schopenhauer’s pessimistic philosophy is incongruous with a harmonious existence and in Nietzschean terms can actually be deemed anesthetic. In contrast Nietzsche claims that in the will to power- as opposed to Schopenhauer's conception of the will to life - humanity has at its disposal the aesthetic state as its mostperfect condition; the least human of all the all-too-human states, for this state facilitates the exaltation of life in both its inherent beauty and ugliness instead of choosing to renounce the duality altogether, which would completely obscure existential meaning. Instead of renouncing ugliness Nietzsche would have us affirm ugliness in order to affirm the whole of life. Whereas Nietzsche initially agreed with Schopenhauer with regards to the will to life as the primary basis for human existence, he took the aesthetic argument a critical step further by tying it into his conception of the will to power as art. This was a life-affirming principle, and also the solution to the problem posed by Schopenhauerean aesthetics. In what he refers to as the transformation of the ‘tragic spirit’ Nietzsche refutes Schopenhauerean pessimism by asserting that one can overcome pessimism and the ugliness that accompanies it through the will to power in the form of art. Thus in Nietzsche's system the aesthetic state is a higher form of being.[iii] This transformation that results can be described as a type of religious experience, signifying primordial liberation and its effect, spiritual transfiguration. Nietzsche saw the philosophy of Schopenhauer as grim and self-destructive, and proposed a “gauge of strength” to measure how fatal a certain idea can be when attempting to apply it to daily life. Our modern understanding of this "gauge of strength" is the Nietzschean art of genealogy. Nietzsche saw this as an opportunity to construct a genealogy of morals, where he then transvaluated all values posited hitherto. One of the values in question was that of beauty.

### AT: Perm

#### The permutation doesn’t solve – it places ugliness in binary relation to beauty – by combining the beauty of the 1AC with the ugliness of the 1NC it brings together the two concepts in a way that they play against each other – the only way to solve is to decouple ugliness from that binary and have it stand as it’s own concept – any binary between the two means the alt doesn’t solve

Przybyło 2010 (Ela, currently completing a PhD in Women's Studies at York University, “The Politics of Ugliness” <http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_180322_en.pdf>)

In this, the final portion of my essay, I wish to suggest that we move away from a reactive formulation of ugliness by divorcing it from the beauty/ugliness binary. While ugliness is commonly dismissed as an undesirable state of the body, I wish to propose that „ugly bodies‟, off all sorts, reappropriate the label and deploy it strategically. I think that this is possible by way of Butler‟s performativity. In this final section of my essay I will employ Derrida‟s deconstruction alongside Butler‟s performativity to propose how we might deconstruct the beauty/ugliness binary and strategically deploy ugliness. Earlier in this essay I discussed binaries as interlocking systems of hierarchical oppositions. Also, throughout this essay I have regularly invoked binaries as pervasive systems, which organize our understanding of ugliness. Jacques Derrida offers us a strategy for unhinging binaries from one another, so that we can move beyond them – deconstruction. This involves „an overturning of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system‟, also known as reversal/displacement, or inversion/displacement (1982, p.329, emphasis added). In other words, the binary is first interrogated, then reversed, and finally done away with. Deconstruction, however, requires ongoing work and any displacements achieved are at best temporary and provisional. „A breach in this oppositional structure is only temporary, and can only sustain itself for a short time‟, as feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz writes (2005, p.7). Butler‟s „performativity‟, which acknowledges the necessarily laborious and repetitive nature of identity construction, is a meaningful way of thinking about both ugliness and deconstruction. It reminds us that binaries exist as long as we collectively and individually repeat them. If, on the other hand, we turn our back on binaries through turning them on their side, we partake in an active and strategic deconstructive process. Butler uses drag as the example par excellence of gender binary deconstruction, suggesting that the body in drag performs gender „differently‟ and thus engages in a temporary and dramatic binary confusion – „parodic repetition‟ (2006, p.186, 189). I see the possibility for ugliness to be also deployed in this way. Rivero observes this performative aspect of ugliness in the Colombian Ugly Betty, noting that ugliness is rendered in the sitcom as a „staged representation‟, „an impersonation‟ (2003, p.72). While the characters in the show shift from performances of „ugliness‟ to performances of „beauty‟ in problematic ways that suggest „everyone can be beautiful‟, the show unwittingly emphasizes the constructedness of beauty and ugliness. Deploying ugliness strategically, in ways that engage in binary deconstruction, may take several forms. First, there is something already transgressive about the presence of „ugly‟ bodies in the public. Certain bodies in certain places function as „space invaders‟, according to Nirmal Puwar, because they disrupt the homogeneity of those spaces and challenge the position of the male body as the somatic norm (2004, p.67). Thus, the presence of a monstrous, dirty, or unaltered body in certain contexts is actually deconstructive and disruptive to binaries in itself. As Mary Russo, writing on the carnivalesque indicates, in the everyday indicative world, women and their bodies, certain bodies, in certain public framings, in certain public spaces, are always transgressive – dangerous, and in danger. (1997, p.323)

#### Public spaces are key

Przybyło 2010 (Ela, currently completing a PhD in Women's Studies at York University, “The Politics of Ugliness” <http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_180322_en.pdf>)

 Second, ugliness may be deployed strategically, through an active and exaggerated performance of ugliness in public spaces. Since the production of beauty requires not only a specific appearance but also a certain code of behaviours, feminists may strategically enact „ugly‟ behaviours as a means of deconstructing binaries such as beauty/ugliness, clean/dirty, public/private, and man/woman. Bartky refers to „disciplinary practices that produce a body which in gesture and appearance is recognizably feminine‟ (1990, p.65, emphasis added). These disciplinary practices function to prescribe the body‟s sizes and contours, its appetite, posture, gestures and general comportment in space and the appearance of each of its visible parts. (p.80) An excessive performance, performative confusion, or complete disregard of these normative behaviours and practices thus allows for a disruption of the conventions of beauty. Karina Eileraas, in „Witches, Bitches, and Fluids‟, explores the performed ugliness of punk and rock girl bands such as Hole. They deploy ugliness through ugly shrieks and wails (1997, p.127), ripped stockings and smudged make-up (p.129), ugly stage aggression (p.129), and the presence of ugly, dirty bodily fluids (p.132). In such ways, Eileraas argues, some girl bands perform ugliness, dismember femininity and normative feminine behaviours, and actively deconstruct spaces of beauty/ugliness and masculinity/femininity through „parad[ing], parrot[ing], and parody[ing]‟ (1997, p.135). It is exactly such multidimensional and excessive performances of ugliness, which create spaces of binary ambiguity and flux. Through acting ugly, and „doing‟ ugly, ugliness is privileged as a site of expression and as an effective feminist tool for unsettling prescriptive norms of behaviour. Finally, ugliness can be deployed strategically through the very act of performative self-naming. At the beginning of this essay, I discussed Kincaid‟s strategy of deploying ugliness against neocolonizers. Edwidge Danticat, on the other hand, provides an instance of the reappropriation or „embrace‟ of the category of ugliness through a deployment of it onto herself. Speaking of the multiple oppressions that Haitian women face, she rallies around a Haitian idiom: we must scream this as far as the wind can carry our voices. “Nou lèd, nou la!” We are ugly, but we are here! (2003, p.27, emphasis added) Through applying the label of ugliness onto herself (and „her people‟), Danticat immobilizes anyone who might want to hurt her by way of using the term „ugly‟ against her. She performs ugliness strategically, through „embracing‟ the category, deploying it in her own name, and reassembling it as something to be proud of. Acknowledging the political implications behind „ugliness‟ – such as racism, colonialism, sexism, and poverty – Danticat refuses to be immobilized by ugliness or by people who may use the term against her. Instead, she exploits it to her own uses, performs it, and deconstructs its meaning through reconfiguring it as a site of pride: as a site of presence, struggle, and endurance.

### Environment

#### Environmental management is inevitable – concrete action key

Levy 99- PhD @ Centre for Critical Theory at Monash

Neil, “Discourses of the Environment,” ed: Eric Darier, p. 215

If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our use of resources, we are, nevertheless unable simply to leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for space, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse or at least limit the effects of our previous interventions. Moreover, there is another reason why our behavior towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207).in fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is not us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result from a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternatives which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by ecologists, environmentalists, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impact which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province of Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the hate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided?

### Vlife

#### Value to life is inevitable, subjective, and they don’t control the link to it.

**Shermer, 8** –Michael, founder of the Skeptics Society and Editor of Skeptic Magazine, “"The Meaning of Life, the Universe, and Everything"”—Commencement Speech at Whittier College, 5/23/08 http://www.whittier.edu/News/Articles/2008CommencementSpeech.aspx

Purpose is personal, and there are countless activities people engage in to satisfy this deep-seated need.There are, however, a handful of powerful means by which we can bootstrap ourselves toward higher goals that have proven to be especially beneficial to both individuals and society. Science tells us that there are five things you can do to create meaning and purpose in your life. Here they are: 1. Love and family—the bonding and attachment to others increases one's sphere of moral inclusion to care about others as much as, if not more than, oneself. And here I shall take a moment to acknowledge the courage of the California State Supreme Court to increase the possibility of marital happiness to the tens of thousands of gays and lesbians in our state who wish to enjoy the same rights and liberties as everybody else. 2. Meaningful work and career—the sense of purpose derived from discovering one's passion for work drives people to achieve goals so far beyond the needs of themselves that they lift all of us to a higher plane, either directly through the benefits of the work, or indirectly through inspiration. And here let me shift my politics slightly rightward to tell you that not only is it okay to make a lot of money, it is a moral virtue to earn your way to wealth and prosperity, and that market capitalism—conjoined with liberal democracy—is the best hope for humanity's future that we have. 3. Recreation and play—it is vital to take time off from work, get away from the office, hang out with your friends, see new places, veg out, goof off, and explore new activities with no purpose other than their shear enjoyment. (In other words, build into your purpose no purpose at all.) 4. Social and political involvement—as a social primate species endowed by evolution with the moral emotions of guilt and pride, shame and joy, we have a social obligation to our local community and our larger society to participate in the process of determining how best we should live together, and a moral duty to reach out and help those in need. Research shows that those who do so are happier and more fulfilled people. 5. Transcendency and spirituality—a capacity unique to our species, as far as we can tell, that includes aesthetic appreciation, spiritual reflection, and transcendent contemplation through a variety of expressions such as art, music, dance, exercise, meditation, prayer, quiet contemplation, and religious revere, connecting us on the deepest level with that which is outside of ourselves.

#### Universal judgment about value of life cannot be made because we are always in the process of becoming

White 90 (Alan, online book, Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/beauty\_and\_goodness.htm).

Insisting that Nietzsche's perspectivism "forbids any general evaluation [of life], positive or negative," Nehamas argues: What Nietzsche eventually comes to attack directly is not any particular judgment but the very tendency to make general judgments about the value of life in itself, as if there were such a single thing with a character of its own, capable of being praised or blamed by some uniform standard. [...] Life itself has no value, but the life of an individual or a group has as great a value as that individual or group can give it.  Some lives are mean or hor­rible, others magnificent.  Life's value depends on what one makes of it, and this is a further sense in which Nietzsche believes that value is created and not discovered. (135) This conclusion, which follows from the forbidding of any general evaluation of life, is, it seems to me, as dangerous in its implications as any of Nietzsche's "words of war," any of his "thunder and fireworks."  If "life itself has no value," and if "some lives are mean and horrible," then those who strive to live beautifully need take no account of those whose lives they deem, on whatever basis, to be ugly.  "Some lives," Nehamas tells us, "are mean or horrible."  I agree, but only if we read Nehamas as asserting that some lives have been mean or horrible.  This correction is vital, for no life can be simply "mean or horrible" until it is over.  The life that appears, as it develops, to be simply "mean or horrible" may be a life whose beauty has not yet emerged.  As Nietzsche notes in what he calls "a parable," "Not every end is a goal.  A melody's end is not its goal; nevertheless, so long as the melody has not reached its end, it also has not reached its goal" (HHII:WS:204).  Perhaps Nehamas is right in asserting that Nietzsche's perspectivism "forbids any general evaluation [of life], positive or negative"; yet, I have argued, Nietzsche attempts to develop a "general" perspective of life, he attempts to see life as it really is.  The lenses of art are not the only lenses we need; Nietzsche exhorts us to view art through the lenses of life.   One of the things we see through the lenses of life is that **no final evaluation of a life can be made until, at least, the life is over.  To say that a life still underway is simply "mean and horrible" is not to express a justifiable opinion, it is to judge prematurely.**